Cornelius HänschDie Schlussrechnung des Insolvenzverwalters
Eine ökonomische Analyse der Kontrolleffektivität auf Grundlage der Principal-Agent-Theorie
Insolvenzrecht in Forschung und Praxis, volume 125
Hamburg 2023, 546 pages
ISBN 978-3-339-13650-3 (print) |ISBN 978-3-339-13651-0 (eBook)
About this book englishenglish
The study provides a comprehensive and informative compilation on the accounting of the insolvency administrator and its audit. It is aimed at improving the effectiveness of the control over the insolvency administrator.
Based on empirically identified deficiencies on final accounting and auditing, the economic approach is applied. Using the vividly presented Principal-Agency-Theory, it is elaborated where to find conflicts of interest between the insolvency administrator and the creditors.
It is shown to what extent the advanced SKR-InsO is suitable to provide indications of breaches of duty. While the SKR-InsO facilitates monitoring because it is easy to read, reduces monitoring costs, and provides indications of any breaches of duty, a final SKR-InsO account is not informative about all conflicts of interest.
By systematically elaborating which standard of review is to be applied the dissertation shows to what extent the review by the insolvency court and the creditors' committee reduces monitoring costs and increases the effectiveness of monitoring. The dissertation addresses the practically relevant questions of the extent to which members of the creditors' committee are liable for a breach of the monitoring duty and whether it is possible to waive the accounting by means of an insolvency plan.
In order to further improve the effectiveness of monitoring, the study also discusses the possibilities that exist in addition to the informational-repressive approach. The study analyzes specific legislative considerations, the appointment of experts to audit, the avoidance of conflicts of interest through the use of questionnaires and the collection of performance indicators. In addition, practical approaches are presented that aim to provide information already during the insolvency proceedings and to make the relevant documents easily accessible electronically.
Keywords
agency costsInsolvenzverwalterInstitutionenökonomikKontrolleÖkonomische AnalysePrincipal-Agent-TheoriePrüfungSchlussrechnungSKR-InsOIhr Werk im Verlag Dr. Kovač
Möchten Sie Ihre wissenschaftliche Arbeit publizieren? Erfahren Sie mehr über unsere günstigen Konditionen und unseren Service für Autorinnen und Autoren.