Tobias BauerfeindDie Regulierung von Ratingagenturen unter der aufsichtlichen Abkehr von externen Ratings in der europäischen Bankenaufsicht

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This dissertation addresses fundamental questions of European law regarding the prudentially indicated use of external ratings of the (three) large (US) rating agencies by credit and financial institutions and other financial market participants to meet their regulatory obligations, in particular the determination of credit risk and regulatory capital. However, the mathematical models on which the risk assessments are based are only functionally limited representations of reality. It becomes particularly problematic if the significance of these is made absolute by the market participants or the banking supervisory authorities, as they can then create the illusion of the controllability of risks. External ratings have become considerably more important in recent years due to their integration into banking regulatory requirements. Since Basel II, external ratings have been institutionalised in European banking supervision as an instrument and indicator for the regulatory capital adequacy and risk assessment of credit institutions. The regulatory environment at EU level, which has been in force since 20 June 2013 with the entry into force of the third Rating Regulation (CRA III), now provides for regulations designed to prevent exclusive or automatic recourse to external ratings for regulatory purposes. Based on these requirements, the measures (under European law) required to eliminate the excessive use of external ratings for regulatory purposes in the EU regulatory regime are examined. In particular, the risk assessment options of credit and financial services institutions, i.e. the standardised approach to credit risk (CRSA) and the approach based on internal ratings (IRB approach), are discussed and analysed in detail. At European level, the CRSA must be made less dependent on external ratings and the IRB approach must be made more comparable and transparent. Finally, the author makes a proposal for a supervisory withdrawal from external ratings in European banking supervision.