Dissertation: Ad-hoc-Publizität bei strafbewehrten Compliance-Verstößen und die Grenze des Nemo-Tenetur-Grundsatzes

Ad-hoc-Publizität bei strafbewehrten Compliance-Verstößen und die Grenze des Nemo-Tenetur-Grundsatzes

Schriften zum Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht, Band 29

Hamburg 2020, 328 Seiten
ISBN 978-3-339-11344-3 (Print), ISBN 978-3-339-11345-0 (eBook)

Ad-hoc-Publizität, Compliance, Diesel-Skandal, Europarecht, Kapitalmarktrecht, MAR, Marktmissbrauchsverordnung, Menschenrechte, Nemo-tenetur-Grundsatz, Primärrechtskonforme Reduktion, Rechtsökonomie, Selbstbelastungsfreiheit, Teleologie, Veröffentlichungspflicht, Volkswagen

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With the eight billion euro shareholder class action against Volkswagen as part of the „diesel gate“, a central problem of the duty to disclose material information „ad-hoc“ under the European Securities Law became apparent: Does a public company have to incriminate itself if a compliance incident is discovered? The existing uncertainty is further intensified by the European harmonization of ad-hoc disclosure duties with the new Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). Additionally, there is a European trend towards the criminalization of companies, which has had a decisive influence on the interpretation of human rights under the Charter and the Convention and has already been reflected in recent case law. The restrained position of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the validity of the doctrine of “nemo-tenetur” for companies is thus becoming less important.

This doctoral thesis focuses on the conflict between ad-hoc disclosure duties under Art. 17 MAR and the right not to incriminate oneself. To this end, the disclosure duties are first examined fundamentally from a law-and-economics perspective to determine its teleology – protection of information traders and cost efficiency of regulation. This forms the basis for the analysis of how conflicts of interest in case of criminal compliance incidents can already be resolved by a postponement pursuant to Art. 17 Para. 4 MAR, since an issuer typically has a justified interest not to incriminate itself. This is also reflected in the time of application of ad-hoc disclosure duties, which depends on the knowledge of the issuer in the absence of a “compliance dimension”. If, however, the disclosure duties nevertheless force any self-incrimination, the doctrine of “nemo-tenetur” under the Charter, the Convention and the constitutional German Basic Law is violated. Therefore, Art. 17 MAR must be amended with an exception, which must already be applied by a reduction of Art. 17 MAR to confirm with European Primary Law.

Link des Autors

linkedIn Christopher Schletter



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